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U.S. Policy on Russia After Bush: History is a Better Guide Than Campaign Rhetoric

by Jonathan Russin, Leonid Sevastianov and Tom Thomson

USRBC publication, Fall 2008

The successor to George W. Bush will inherit several complex and contentious issues in the U.S.-Russia relationship that will challenge both countries to act as strategic partners on issues of mutual concern while aggressively competing with each other for political and economic influence. In the middle of the 2008 presidential election campaign, a five-day war between Georgia and Russia erupted that has become a historic turning point in the post-Cold War relationship between Russia and the West. How should Senators Obama and McCain respond to this extraordinary event in the midst of a hotly contested election campaign? Would their campaign policy positions on Russia be the same if they were the next President and Commander-in-Chief?

The outbreak of the armed conflict in Georgia replaced the candidates’ debate on hypothetical foreign policy questions with an extremely dangerous international crisis whose outcome could have long-term implications for the U.S.-Russia relationship. Senator McCain’s already critical stance toward Russia rose to new levels of rhetoric and was initially more aggressive than the positions of the Bush Administration and Senator Obama. However, both candidates joined with the U.S. and other Western governments in condemning Russia and calling for an international peacekeeping force and mediation to resolve the conflicts over the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Obama and McCain supported a reexamination of Georgia’s bid to begin a Membership Action Plan for NATO membership. Obama urged a review of all multilateral and bilateral agreements with Russia, including Russia’s application for WTO membership, a position that Senator McCain discussed prior to the conflict.1

The timing and content of statements by Senators Obama and McCain on the Georgia conflict reflect the fact the statements were made in their roles as political candidates and not as the President of the United States. History suggests that the next incoming U.S. president will make policy decisions based on what is in the national interest and to achieve broad foreign policy objectives and priorities, even if such decisions would oppose a candidate’s position on Russia. For Russian and American stakeholders in the U.S.-Russia relationship, understanding the views and intentions of the Democratic and Republican nominees should be seen as an indication of future policy, but not as an absolute prediction. Campaign statements will be major factors that could maintain or undercut momentum on the many political and economic issues the two nations have in common, such as international terrorism, managing Iran, trade, and commerce.

McCain and Obama on Russia Before the Armed Conflict in Georgia Prior to the armed conflict in Georgia, each candidate was highly critical of Russia, but McCain more so than his Democratic rival. Senator McCain’s criticism of Russia had been consistently wide- ranging, sharp and nearly unsparing. He had criticized Vladimir Putin’s past career as a KGB officer, his role in moving Russia away from democracy and towards autocracy, and pointedly rejected President George W. Bush’s view that Vladimir Putin was someone that could be trusted. Under Putin, McCain charged, Russia has used energy to extort political concessions from its neighbors and has stonewalled the murder investigation of former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko. In words reminiscent of the Cold War, the McCain campaign has called for, “effective missile defense against rogue nations like Iran and North Korea, and to hedge against possible threats from strategic competitors like Russia and China.” 2 At the same time, McCain’s call for ousting Russia from the G8 was made in the same speech as his promise immediately to engage Russia in nuclear arms talks if he were elected President and to work together with Russia, “to stop the spread of nuclear
Republican presidential candidate
John McCain weapons.” 3  Nevertheless, Russian media regularly covered Senator McCain’s comments on Russia and predicted that Russia’s relationship with the U.S. would deteriorate further under a McCain Administration.
In contrast to his Republican opponent, Senator Obama’s views on Russia were less well known. During the primary campaign and later as the Democratic Party’s presumptive presidential nominee, Obama called for tough policies on Russia, citing a deterioration of human rights and democracy, but his comments were mild when compared to those of Senator McCain. Several Russian commentators characterized Obama as the safer alternative over John McCain, but criticized Obama for lacking clear positions on the U.S.-Russia relationship. In fact, Senator Obama had staked out a position for U.S.- Russia cooperation on nuclear proliferation, which calls for further reductions in each country’s arsenal of nuclear weapons and to work together with other countries to expand civilian uses of nuclear power and to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons. He underscored that this would also be the basis for a policy of engagement with Russia on other issues of mutual concern. 4  Still, Russians were unsure about Senator Obama. Questions were raised about his positions on U.S.-Russia policy and lack of foreign policy experience. One Russian commentator even compared Obama to Gorbachev, who also had a “change” platform for the former Soviet Union that resulted in unpredictable and painful results.5

Georgia, Realpolitik and the 2008 U.S. Presidential Campaign
The war between Russia and Georgia quickly changed the focus of the campaign from rhetoric to the realities of a regional dispute that threatened to spiral out of control. McCain charged Russia with, “using violence against Georgia, in part, to intimidate other neighbors such as Ukraine for choosing to associate with the West and for adhering to Western political and economic values.6  He urged a multilateral response through the United Nations, G-7 and NATO, which included dispatching a peacekeeping force to South Ossetia and reconsidering NATO’s decision to withhold a Membership Action Plan from Georgia. Obama, too, condemned Russia for invading Georgia and called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of Russian troops and urgent humanitarian aid for suffering civilians in Georgia and South Ossetia. He called for a diplomatic solution brokered by the United States, the European Union and the United Nations to resolve the conflict and the use of a UN-mandated peacekeeping force.7  In the end, Obama and McCain’s position on a diplomatic strategy were very similar. They even agreed that NATO should reevaluate Georgia for a Membership Action Plan, which, of course, would be anathema to Russia.

In the weeks following the signing of a ceasefire agreement, Georgia was the main topic of debate on foreign policy between the candidates. The contrast between McCain’s openly pro-Georgia and anti-Russian positions versus Obama’s more nuanced position — which called for internationally supervised resolution to the disputes over South Ossetia and Abkhazia — was striking. McCain reiterated several times that Russia’s membership in the G-8 and its WTO application should be reviewed and that NATO should reconsider Georgia for membership. He attacked Obama’s response to the armed conflict in Georgia as a sign of his foreign policy inexperience. The Obama campaign responded that, “McCain is willing to shoot from the hip” and adding, “that McCain’s comments [condemning Russia] may or may not have complicated the situation.” At the same time, the heated rhetoric between the U.S. and Russia continued over apparent delays in withdrawing Russian military units from Georgia and reached higher temperatures when the U.S. and Poland signed an agreement to base American interceptors as part of the missile defense plan. An already tense situation worsened with Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkahzia as independent states, the West’s threats of sanctions and sharp rhetorical exchanges between the political leadership of Russia and Western nations.

Did the reactions of John McCain or Barack Obama to the crisis in Georgia give us clues on how they might act if they were President of the United States? Washington Post columnist David Ignatius writes “The contrast was between hot (McCain) and cool (Obama); between quick action and cautious deliberation; between a man with his eye on
Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama military and strategic issues and another who is focused on diplomacy.” 8  The differing approaches offered by McCain and Obama to U.S. policy towards Russia and other foreign policy challenges is a central campaign issue in the foreign policy debate. In the end, the voters will decide which approach they prefer.

The View of the U.S.-Russia Relationship from the Oval Office Were John McCain and Barack Obama speaking as candidates trying to win votes or as presumptive heads of state signaling their policy intentions toward Russia?

Russian and foreign commentators have tried to divine the answers through exhaustive dissections of the candidate’s speeches the backgrounds of their advisors, and their foreign policy experience to find clues. Undoubtedly, the Georgia conflict has deeply complicated the political debate in the U.S. and in Russia on how to manage the already troubled U.S.- Russia relationship. Where does that leave us? While several plausible scenarios have emerged, the fact is that history has repeatedly shown that the analysts were generally wrong about the incoming U.S. president. The presidential candidate most critical of Russia has often become a strategic partner on controlling nuclear proliferation, fighting international terrorism or improving trade. But history is not the only factor. Every incoming U.S. president inherits a policy infrastructure of international agreements and treaties, collaborative policy initiatives, as well as the dynamics of the relationship between the outgoing U.S. president and the current Russian leader. An incoming U.S. president who ignores these realities would do so at his own political risk, despite his campaign rhetoric on Russia.

During the Cold War, every Republican and Democratic presidential candidate took a hard-line stance toward the Soviet Union. However, this did not stop John F. Kennedy from starting secret discussions with Nikita Khrushchev after the U.S. and USSR barely averted a nuclear war over Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, leading to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Nor did it dissuade Richard Nixon from making his bold diplomatic initiative to meet with Leonid Brezhnev in 1972, inaugurating the period of Detente that reduced tensions and promoted greater cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Nor did it give pause to Ronald Reagan to work together with Mikhail Gorbachev to end the Cold War.

In the post-Soviet period, Russia’s political ideology changed, but the political rhetoric of the U.S. presidential candidates was often similar to the Cold War period. In the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign, candidate George W. Bush said Russia was in danger of reverting back to the days of the USSR under former KGB colonel Vladimir Putin. However, after his first summit meeting with President Putin, he said that he looked into Putin’s eyes and saw someone he could trust.

The Vast Infrastructure of the U.S.- Russia Relationship Previous U.S. presidents initiated a policy framework of U.S.-Russia treaties and agreements that have played a significant role in defining the U.S.-Russia relationship. From the current WTO accession negotiations to the post-Cold War Nunn-Lugar programs to reprocess weapons grade plutonium into fuel for civilian nuclear power plants to the International Space Station, among others, these policy initiatives are part of the fabric in the U.S.-Russia relationship. Even at the lowest points of the often caustic debate between the U.S. and Russia about placing anti-missile sites in Eastern Europe or expanding NATO into Ukraine and Georgia, these important policy initiatives have remained intact. However, the impact of the armed conflict in Georgia has yet fully to emerge.

In early April 2008, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin held their last official meeting in Sochi, Russia, which produced the U.S.- Russia Strategic Framework Declaration, a non-binding agreement that sets out a plan for the bilateral relations of both countries. This agreement was set out as the policy framework for the relationship between President Medvedev and President Bush until early 2009 and the arrival of the new U.S. president. Yes, the conflict in Georgia has drastically altered the dynamics of the bilateral relationship. During this period, the U.S. and Russia could, hopefully, develop a better understanding on Georgia, missile defense and other contentious issues in the U.S.-Russia relationship, as well as reinvigorate positive cooperation in such issues as civilian nuclear energy before the next President starts his term in office.

While campaign rhetoric is for winning votes, one policy position that is shared by both presidential candidates is worth revisiting due to the fundamental change it would have on U.S. foreign policy. Obama and McCain have pledged to exchange a unilateral approach to foreign relations for a multilateral approach. The next U.S. president would be more likely to work within the framework of the United Nations and other existing international treaties and organizations to build support for policies and to address disputes, such as
President George W. Bush (r.) confers with then R.F. President Vladimir Putin South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Under these conditions, Russia would likely continue to be a key participant in any U.S. initiatives on Iran, North Korea and nuclear proliferation. Moreover, U.S.-Russia cooperation in these key areas could lead to other joint initiatives to address global warming and how to revise the architecture of governance structures for international trade and finance institutions to address the rising economic and political influence of Russia, China, India, and other key emerging markets.

Promoting democracy will continue to be official U.S. policy. However, no matter who will be the next U.S. president, U.S. foreign policy will likely be modified to undo damage to America’s image in the years following the start of the Iraq war. Senator Obama has acknowledged that the U.S. must be more flexible in its approach to policymaking with emerging economies and democracies, as well as countries with which the U.S. has serious concerns, such as Iran and North Korea. Senator McCain’s approach is reminiscent of the Bush Administration, but with a major concession to the importance of multilateralism. He has proposed to create a League of Democracies, a multi-national coalition that can harness the vast influence of more than one hundred democratic nations around the world to advance our values and defend our shared interests. While McCain’s rhetoric on Russia remains tough, he underscores the importance of the U.S., “to listen to the views and respect the collective will of our democratic allies.” 9  Pragmatism and interdependence on issues of mutual concern have been a key factor in the U.S.-Russia relationship, such as managing international terrorism, nuclear proliferation and climate change, and are more likely to generate cooperation, rather than confrontation.

Not to be overlooked is the fact that the U.S.- Russia Strategic Framework Agreement is also about preserving the multi-billion dollar economic and business engagement between Russia and the United States. The Russian economy is one of the fastest growing in the world. The U.S. has been a strong advocate for Russia to accede into the WTO and to integrate fully into the international community. U.S. businesses and investors are actively investing and partnering with Russian business in industry, consumer goods and services. While on a smaller scale, Russian investment in the U.S. is growing, particularly in the steel sector — which has been a welcome development for this struggling industry. To build on these mutually beneficial economic conditions, the U.S. business community will lobby the next presidential administration for policies to expand commercial opportunities in Russia.

A key factor in U.S. policy toward Russia will be the relationship between President Medvedev and the next U.S. President. The chemistry between the incoming Russian and U.S. political leaders will make a significant difference between a foreign policy of cooperation and healthy competition versus confrontation. History has given us plenty of examples of the “good chemistry” relationship, such as George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin and Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush with Mikhail Gorbachev. If modern history is our guide, the next U.S. president, despite the tone of his campaign rhetoric, will likely follow in the footsteps of their predecessors in dealing with President Medvedev.

Predicting the next U.S. president’s policies on Russia is at best a guessing game. It is clear the armed conflict in Georgia has been a game-changing event in the U.S.-Russia relationship. The U.S. policy debate on engaging versus isolating Russia will be intense. It is, however, clear that the U.S.-Russia relationship must be pragmatic and recognize our interdependencies in economic development, energy security, fighting international terrorism and controlling nuclear proliferation, to name only a few.

How much it will influence the next U.S. president’s policies on political and economic issues of mutual concern to both countries will not be known until the next administration takes office. A presidential campaign is a different reality from the world facing an incoming president after the oath of office has been administered. The momentary memory lapse of a presidential candidate who is unable to pronounce President Medvedev’s name in a televised debate is less important than if the U.S. and Russian leaders are able to address the challenges of the U.S.-Russia relationship in the 21st century with sound judgment and with an acute awareness of the consequences for failing to meet this responsibility.

Endnotes:

Jonathan Russin, Leonid Sevastianov and Tom Thomson are principals of RST International, LLC, an international business and strategic communications consultancy.

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